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Abstract
According to the previous literature on hiring, ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ
when deciding on external recruiting: From an incentive perspective,
external recruiting is harmful since admission of external candidates
reduces internal workers’ career incentives. However, if external work-
ers have high abilities hiring from outside is beneﬁcial to improve job
assignment. In our model, external workers do not have superior abil-
ities. We show that external hiring can be proﬁtable from a pure
incentive perspective. By opening its career system, a ﬁrm decreases
the incentives of its low-ability workers. The incentives of high-ability
workers can increase from a homogenization of the pool of applicants.
Whenever this eﬀect dominates, a ﬁrm prefers to admit external ap-
plicants. If vacancies arise simultaneously, ﬁrms face a coordination
problem when setting wages. If ﬁrms serve the same product market,
weaker ﬁrms use external recruiting and their wage policy to oﬀset
their competitive disadvantage.
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11 Introduction
When deciding on external recruiting, a ﬁrm faces the following well-known
trade-oﬀ:1 On the one hand, ﬁlling vacancies with external applicants de-
stroys career incentives of internal workers. In particular, allowing external
workers to apply for a vacant position already discourages internal candi-
dates, who optimally react by reducing their eﬀorts.2 On the other hand,
expanding the pool of applicants can improve the pool’s average quality and,
therefore, lead to a better staﬃng than without external applicants.
In our paper, we show that this traditional trade-oﬀ between better job
assignment and reduced incentives does not necessarily hold. On the con-
trary, we show that external recruiting can be beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to improve
incentives. Expanding the pool of applicants leads to a discouragement of a
ﬁrm’s workforce but possibly also to a more homogeneous ﬁeld of applicants,
which increases incentives. If this advantage dominates discouragement, the
ﬁrm will optimally decide in favor of external recruiting. In our model, exter-
nal candidates do not have superior talents. Thus, if a ﬁrm admits external
candidates, the traditional beneﬁt of improving the pool of applicants cannot
play any role.
We consider two ﬁrms employing heterogeneous workers. Workers have
either a high ability or a low ability. If a ﬁrm has to ﬁll a vacant position
and thinks about external recruiting, it must keep the following externalities
in mind:3 Since the number of workers competing for the vacant position
increases, external recruiting discourages own high-ability and low-ability
workers. If the ability diﬀerence between the two types of workers is suﬃ-
ciently large and the number of high-ability workers exceeds a critical value,
then the low-ability workers will be completely discouraged and choose zero
1See, e.g., Chan (1996), Chen (2005), Tsoulouhas et al. (2007).
2Moreover, the ﬁrm harms its reputation of honoring good performance of its workers
via job-promotion to higher hierarchy levels.
3See Konrad (2009), chapter 5, on other externalities in contests.
2eﬀorts. Thus, only the high-ability workers remain active in the competition.
These workers’ incentives are boosted by the homogenization of the set of
eﬀective players. If this advantage outweighs the lost incentives of the low-
ability workers, the hiring ﬁrm will admit external applicants from a pure
incentive perspective.
This paper completely focuses on incentives. Including the quality of
the recruiting decision (i.e., the ability of the worker that is assigned to the
vacant position) would even strengthen our argument for external recruiting:
Without external candidates, both internal low-ability and internal high-
ability workers have a positive probability of being promoted. If, in the
situation described above, external workers are allowed to apply, so that
low-ability (internal and external) workers are completely discouraged, the
vacant position is ﬁlled with a high-ability worker for sure.
In the second part of the paper, we address those externalities in recruiting
that arise if ﬁrms serve the same product market and/or have simultaneous
vacancies. If the two ﬁrms A and B compete for the same customers but
only ﬁrm A has a vacant position, this ﬁrm A is less likely to allow for
external applications compared to the basic model with separate product
markets. Under product market competition, opening of A’s career system
for external workers generates a positive externality for the other ﬁrm B.
The workforce of ﬁrm B gets incentives for free, which makes B a stronger
competitor to A in the product market. Consequently, external recruiting
becomes less attractive for ﬁrm A.
Firms A and B face a diﬀerent problem when they have simultaneous
vacancies but serve diﬀerent customers. Now, positive externalities of gen-
erating incentives for the other workforce when opening its career system to
outsiders leads to a coordination problem. If workers are not too heteroge-
neous, there will exist two pure equilibria. In either equilibrium, one ﬁrm
creates incentives for all workers by attaching a positive wage to the vacancy,
3whereas the other ﬁrm free rides on the given incentives and chooses a zero
wage.
If ﬁrms A and B have vacant positions and operate in the same market,
externalities aﬀect both work incentives and the competitive situation of
the ﬁrms. In case of heterogeneous ﬁrms, the stronger one is interested in
generating high incentives in order to increase its competitive advantage,
whereas the weak ﬁrm wants to destroy incentives. As an interior solution,
only mixed equilibria exist where the strong (weak) ﬁrm puts relatively more
probability mass on high (low) wages.
Our paper is related to the contest literature,4 in particular to those
contest papers that also address the problem of external recruiting. Chan
(1996) considers a homogeneous internal workforce and ﬁnds that opening
up the contest to external candidates reduces work incentives for existing
employees. To restore incentives, outsiders can be handicapped (disadvan-
taged). Tsoulouhas et al. (2007) examine the trade-oﬀ between incentives
and the sorting of high ability workers into the top positions. If external
candidates are suﬃciently better than insiders, it can be optimal for the ﬁrm
to handicap current employees. In Waldman (2003), the time-inconsistency
problem built into this trade-oﬀ is considered: for incentive reasons the ﬁrm
should favor internal workers ex ante but should not distinguish between in-
ternal and external workers ex post. An internal labor market can serve as
a commitment device to avoid this problem. Chen (2005) shows that exter-
nal recruitment can be optimal from a pure incentive perspective if internal
workers can choose between productive activities and sabotage. Allowing
external competition reduces the eﬀectiveness of sabotage and thus workers
will substitute productive eﬀort for sabotage. A similar argument applies for
preventing workers’ collusion.
All of these contributions consider a homogeneous internal workforce5.
4For an overview see Konrad (2009).
5In Waldman (2003), internal workers are heterogeneous. However, during the contest
4This situation gives strong incentives to existing workers since success is
highly dependent on individual eﬀort. The introduction of external workers
thus works clearly in the direction of decreasing overall incentives for internal
candidates (when collusion is not a concern). In contrast, we consider het-
erogeneous internal workers. For this setting, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and
Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983) have argued that handicapping the more able
contestants can increase overall incentives. However, this kind of handicap
is only possible when the ability of each worker is known to the ﬁrm. We
show that the ﬁrm has another possibility to create a more balanced contest
when only the distribution of types in- and outside the ﬁrm is known: By
allowing external candidates to apply, internal low ability workers will drop
out of the competition and incentives for the remaining high ability workers
are increased.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next two sec-
tions, the basic model is described and solved. Section 4 considers product
market competition. In Section 5, we examine simultaneous vacancies. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
We consider two adjacent hierarchy levels in each of two ﬁrms A and B. At
the lower hierarchy level, ﬁrm F (F = A,B) employs nFL workers of type
L and nFH workers of type H with nFL + nFH ≥ 2. Let NFL and NFH
denote the corresponding sets of players, that is NFL (NFH) describes the
set of L-type (H-type) workers employed by ﬁrm F, consisting of #NFL =
nFL (#NFH = nFH) elements. In addition, let NF = NFL ∪ NFH denote
the set of all workers employed at the lower hierarchy level of ﬁrm F, and
nF = nFL + nFH the respective number of these workers. The four numbers
stage abilities are not known to anyone and therefore all workers have the same expected
ability.
5nAL, nAH, nBL and nBH are common knowledge of all players, but only the
individual worker knows his own type. The type of a worker refers to his
ability so that L indicates a low-ability worker, whereas the subscript H
corresponds to a worker with high ability. Let nL = nAL + nBL denote the
total number of L-type workers and nH = nAH +nBH the respective number
of H-type workers, and n = nL + nH the overall number of workers that are
located at the lower tiers of both ﬁrms’ hierarchies. The corresponding sets
are labeled NL, NH and N, respectively. The two ﬁrms or employers A and
B and all n workers are assumed to be risk neutral. Workers are protected
by limited liability so that their wages must be non-negative. Furthermore,
each worker has a zero reservation value.
It is assumed that nature chooses one of the two ﬁrms randomly to have
a vacant position at the higher hierarchy level that must be ﬁlled. The
respective ﬁrm F can either promote one of its nF internal candidates or
ﬁll the vacancy with an external hire. In other words, ﬁrms A and B have
comparable technologies in the sense that working on the lower level of either
ﬁrm qualiﬁes a worker to ﬁll a vacancy at the higher level of both ﬁrms.
The n workers choose non-negative eﬀorts ei at personal cost ei/ti with
ti ∈ {tL,tH}, tH > tL > 0, reﬂecting worker i’s talent or ability (i ∈ N).
Hence, ﬁrm F has nFL (nFH) workers of talent tL (tH). Workers’ eﬀorts




for employer F with v ( ) > 0,
v′ ( ) > 0, limx→∞ v′ (x) = 0 and v′′ ( ) < 0. In words, the value function is
monotonically increasing, strictly concave with vanishing increments as well





are directly observable by the employer. For example, the ﬁrm’s
value of workers’ eﬀorts will be realized in the future or it corresponds to a
rather complex good or service whose quality cannot be directly determined.6
However, an employer can use a coarse signal on relative performance
6See MacLeod (2003), p. 219, on this point.
6for ﬁlling the vacant position. With probability pi (e1,...,ei,...,em), this
signal tells ﬁrm F that worker i has performed best, so that worker i gets
the contract oﬀer for the vacant position. Here, m denotes the number of
workers that are included in the employer’s chosen career system (i.e., either
m = n or m = nF). Let M denote the set of these workers. In any case,
the ﬁrm does not have information on who has performed second-best and
so on. This kind of coarse signal particularly holds for those situations where
the m workers compete against each other in the same market with only the
winner becoming visible. For example, we can think of competition between
salesmen for a certain key customer where the only public information is
the identity of the salesman who is accepted by the customer. As a second
example, we can imagine a situation with diﬀerent industrial researchers
competing in the same innovation race. Competition immediately stops when
one of them has made the innovation. In that situation, it is diﬃcult to





indicates that, from the ﬁrm’s point of view, ﬁnishing
the observable task (e.g., acquiring a key customer or making an innovation)
is only one valuable aspect of workers’ eﬀort choices.
To simplify matters, we adopt the signal structure that is frequently used
in the literature on innovation races (e.g., Loury 1979, Dasgupta and Stiglitz
1980, Denicolo 2000, Baye and Hoppe 2003). Given eﬀort ei, let
G(τi|ei) = 1 − exp(−h   ei   τi) (1)
denote the probability that worker i succeeds (i.e., acquires a certain key cus-
tomer or solves a certain problem by making an innovation) before time τi.
(1) describes an exponential distribution with density g (τi|ei) = dG(τi|ei)/dτi
and hazard rate h > 0. The workers’ success times are assumed to be stochas-
tically independent, so that worker i’s conditional probability of succeeding
7ﬁrst and, hence, winning the recruiting contest is given by
P (i wins|τi) =
 
j∈M\{i}



































For the special case of
 
j∈M ej = 0 we assume that each worker’s winning
probability is given by 1/m.7
In order to focus on diﬀerent ﬁrms that compete with their career systems
in the same labor market we assume that each ﬁrm can credibly commit to
assign the best performer to the higher hierarchy level in case of a vacancy.8
Moreover, we neglect other possible incentive schemes. The only possibility of
a ﬁrm to generate incentives is to design a recruiting contest for the vacant
position at the higher level. Here, ﬁrm F can either restrict competition
to internal candidates or widen worker competition by accepting external
candidates as well. To install a recruiting contest, the ﬁrm announces a wage
w ≥ 0 that is attached to the vacant job. The best performing worker gets
this job. All other workers get zero wages as optimal contest loser prizes
since workers are protected by limited liability and have zero reservation
values.9 We concentrate on incentive issues and, at the end of Section 3,
7See already Tullock (1980).
8E.g., the signal on the best performer is veriﬁable.
9In other words, since the ﬁrm does not have more information on workers’ ranking,
any positive loser prize would only increase the ﬁrm’s labor costs and decrease workers’
8shortly comment on the consequences of job assignment on ﬁrm proﬁts.
We can summarize the time schedule of the basic model as follows:
1 2 3 4 5
-
nature ﬁrm ﬁrm workers payments
chooses decides on chooses choose are made
vacancy external wage w eﬀorts
in A or B recruiting ei
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, nature randomly selects one of the ﬁrms A
and B to have a vacancy on the higher hierarchy level. At stage 2, this ﬁrm
F has to make the policy decision whether to accept external candidates or










at stage 3. The optimal wage attached to the vacant job also describes the
contract oﬀered to each of the internal workers at the lower hierarchy level.
Any worker will accept a feasible contract with w ≥ 0 since workers have
zero reservation values but a non-negative payoﬀ when participating in the
career game and choosing zero eﬀort. Thus, we do not have to care for the
workers’ participation constraints when solving the game. In stage 4, all n
workers observe the ﬁrm’s recruiting policy (including w) and simultaneously
choose eﬀorts to compete for the vacant position. Finally, the best performing
worker that is assigned to the vacant higher-level job gets w, whereas the
other workers get zero. The ﬁrm F that has ﬁlled its vacancy earns proﬁt
(3) and the other ﬁrm ˆ F ∈ {A,B}\{F} receives v
  
i∈N ˆ F ei
 
. After having
solved the game of the basic model we will turn to the case of both ﬁrms
incentives.
9competing in the same product market.
3 Solution to the Basic Model
We solve the game by backwards induction starting with stage 4, where the
m workers simultaneously choose their eﬀorts. Of course, if workers of ﬁrm
ˆ F cannot apply for the vacant position since ﬁrm F has excluded candidates
from outside they will optimally choose zero eﬀorts in order to save eﬀort
costs. However, workers of ﬁrm F are always included in the recruiting
contest. Let mH denote the number of H-type workers and mL the number
of L-type workers that are allowed to apply for the vacant job with wage
w > 0. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium in which
workers of the same type choose identical eﬀort levels. If tH (mH − 1) ≥
mHtL, then L-type workers choose e∗















tHtL (m − 1)(mLtH − (mL − 1)tL)
(mHtL + mLtH)
2 . (5)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that we have two possible outcomes at the contest
stage. Either outcome is symmetric in the sense that H-type workers choose
identical eﬀorts and L-type workers choose identical eﬀorts. If the H-type
workers are suﬃciently more able than the L-type workers, the latter ones
will be completely discouraged and drop out of the competition by choosing
zero eﬀort. The larger the number of H-type workers the more likely will
be this outcome. In particular, for mH → ∞ the L-type workers will even
10drop out if the H-type workers have only a marginally higher ability since
condition tH ≥
mH
mH−1tL becomes tH ≥ tL. The number of H-type workers
also discourages the high-ability workers. They will not drop out, but their
equilibrium eﬀort level monotonically decreases in mH. Recall that either
mH = nAH + nBH or mH = nFH. Hence, if L-type workers drop out under
pure internal competition they will drop out as well if ﬁrm F opens its career
system for external hires, whereas the opposite result does not necessarily
hold. Altogether, opening the career system to outsiders can generate strong
externalities by discouraging the weak internal workers.
If tH (mH − 1) < mHtL, the recruiting contest will have an equilibrium
with both types of workers exerting positive eﬀorts. From (4) and (5) we
can see that equilibrium eﬀorts increase in the wage w and that e∗
H > e∗
L
since mLtH − (mL − 1)tL > mHtL − (mH − 1)tH. Moreover, the level of a
worker’s equilibrium eﬀort crucially depends on two factors – the number of
contestants and the degree of heterogeneity between the workers. These two
factors can be highlighted by considering them separately. In order to point







wtHtL (2¯ m − 1)(tH + tL)
¯ m2 (tL + tH)
2 ,
which is clearly decreasing in ¯ m. Thus, analogously to the case of a corner
solution considered in the paragraph before, each worker is discouraged if the
number of opponents increases.
To emphasize the role of heterogeneity let, for illustrating purposes, mH =









10Since by assumption of the basic model, nFL + nFH ≥ 2, we are in a situation where
external workers are excluded.
11Hence, for a given amount of collective talent, tL + tH, workers’ eﬀorts are
maximized if heterogeneity diminishes (i.e., tL = tH). This ﬁnding is quite
intuitive and also in line with results in other contest models: The closer
the race between the contestants the more eﬀort each player will choose in
equilibrium. Both eﬀects – discouragement by a larger number of contestants
and encouragement by a small degree of heterogeneity among the workers –
are crucial for ﬁrm F’s decision whether to allow external recruiting or not.
Anticipating the workers’ behavior in the recruiting contest, at stages 2
and 3 ﬁrm F solves the design problem for ﬁlling the vacancy at its higher
hierarchy level. Let V denote the inverse of the marginal value function v′ ( ).
Then we get the following results:
Proposition 2 Let ﬁrm F strictly prefer a positive wage.11 F allows exter-


















In that case, F optimally chooses
w
∗ = Φ1   V (Φ1) with Φ1 =
n2
H
nFH (nH − 1)tH
. (8)
In all other cases, F does not admit external applications and chooses
w











Proof. See Appendix A.











12Remark There exist feasible parameter constellations that satisfy (6) and (7)
at the same time. Consider, for example, n ˆ FH = nFL = η > 0 and nFH = 1
with ˆ F denoting the other ﬁrm. For this parameter constellation, conditions
(6) and (7) boil down to
0 < tL ≤ tH
η
1 + η






There are feasible values of tL and tH that satisfy both inequalities for any
positive integer η.
From Proposition 1 we know that L-type workers will drop out and choose
zero eﬀort, if the number of H-type workers is suﬃciently large. Hence, from
the perspective of ﬁrm F we can diﬀerentiate between three cases – (1) the
number of internal H-type workers is so large that L-type workers even drop
out without external competition, (2) L-type workers only drop out if F
opens the career system for external candidates but not under pure internal
competition, (3) L-type workers never drop out. Proposition 2 shows that
only in case (2) ﬁrm F may be interested in allowing external applications.
In that case, F strictly beneﬁts from the strong externalities induced by the
outsiders. F will prefer an open career system if the increased eﬀort levels of
its H-type workers exceed the lost eﬀorts of its L-type workers who become
completely discouraged and drop out. In particular, three eﬀects are at work
that crucially inﬂuence ﬁrm F’s decision to allow external recruiting: (i) Since
the L-type workers drop out, there is pure homogeneous competition among
H-type workers. As equilibrium eﬀorts are highest the more homogeneous the
players, F strictly proﬁts from an active homogeneous workforce. (ii) Firm
F loses the valuable eﬀorts of his L-type workers, who exert zero eﬀorts. (iii)
Allowing external candidates changes the number of active contestants. In
general, a single worker will be discouraged and, hence, supply less eﬀort
the larger the number of his opponents. Whereas F strictly beneﬁts from
13(i) and suﬀers from (ii) the direction of this third eﬀect is not clear. On
the one hand, the number of active players decreases as L-type workers drop
out, which encourages each remaining H-type worker. On the other hand,
additional H-type workers from the other ﬁrm enter the competition, which
increases the number of active players.
We can identify these three eﬀects when looking at condition (7).12 This
inequality is more likely to be satisﬁed if tH is rather large and tL rather small.
The larger tH the more F will proﬁt from enhanced competition between his
H-type workers. The smaller tL the smaller will be F’s losses from his L-
type workers, who become completely passive. A similar interpretation can
be obtained for nFL: Condition (7) is equivalent to
























which is strictly positive according to (6). Hence, the smaller nFL the smaller
will be F’s losses from completely discouraging all of his L-type workers and
the more F will tend to open its career system for external workers. Finally,
the left-hand side of (7) is non-decreasing (and for nH > 2 strictly increasing)
in nH. This ﬁnding is quite intuitive, following eﬀect (iii) above. Recall that
nH also contains the number of H-type workers of the other ﬁrm, n ˆ FH. The
larger this number, the larger will be the number of active contestants when
allowing external candidates to apply. Since the equilibrium eﬀort level of a
single H-type worker decreases in the number of opponents when the ﬁeld of
players is completely homogeneous (see Proposition 1), a larger value of n ˆ FH
12Condition (6) only states that we are in case (2).
14makes opening the career system for ﬁrm F less attractive.
The argument given at the end of the last paragraph exactly explains
why ﬁrm F does not open its career system in case (1) described above. The
only eﬀect of such opening would be a discouragement of the internal H-
type workers since mH increases from mH = nFH to mH = nFH +n ˆ FH. The
remaining case (3) deals with the scenario where L-type workers never give
up by choosing zero eﬀorts. At ﬁrst sight, it is not clear whether opening
of the career system may be proﬁtable for F. Of course, allowing external
applications unambiguously increases the number of contestants, which dis-
courages each internal worker. However, maybe the additional contestants
lead to a better mixture of workers so that the ﬁeld becomes more homoge-
neous. Proposition 2 shows that this possible advantage is not strong enough
to justify opening of the career system.
In this paper, we do not address the ﬁrm’s consequences of assigning a
worker with certain talent t to the vacant position at the higher hierarchy
level. However, since the vacant position is typically accompanied by higher
responsibility and inﬂuence on ﬁrm proﬁts, the ﬁrm should prefer t = tH
to t = tL for the new job holder. Note that given such preference the ﬁrm
additionally proﬁts in case (2) from ensuring the assignment of an H-type
worker to the higher position. Since all L-type workers drop out of the
competition and, thus, have a zero probability of winning the contest, opening
the career system guarantees optimal selection of workers as a by-product.
Finally, equations (8) and (9) show that the workers’ abilities and the
numbers of diﬀerent types of workers play an ambiguous role for ﬁrm F’s
choice of the optimal wage, w∗. This can be exemplarily seen from (8).
Note that V ( ) is monotonically decreasing since the value function v is
increasing and concave. On the one hand, a high talent tH corresponds to
high equilibrium eﬀorts and makes investing in incentives rather attractive
for F. On the other hand, marginal returns from eﬀort supply are decreasing
15due to the concavity of the value function, which makes incentivizing workers
less attractive to F.
4 Product Market Competition
We now turn to the case where both ﬁrms compete in the same product
market. Again, ﬁrm F has to ﬁll a vacancy and has to decide whether or not
to open its career system for the workers of its competitor ˆ F.
The basic structure of the model remains the same as in Section 2. How-
ever, under product market competition, the proﬁt of ﬁrm F does not only
depend on its own workers’ eﬀorts but also on the eﬀorts of its competitor ˆ F’s
workers. The higher the total eﬀort of the rival ﬁrm’s workforce, the lower
should be F’s proﬁt. This eﬀect seems to be natural if ﬁrms directly compete













where the function ψ ( ) has the following properties: ψ is a monotonically
increasing, strictly positive, continuously diﬀerentiable and bounded function
on R which is strictly concave on R+ and for which ψ(x)+ψ(−x) is constant
in x. The last assumption captures the idea that the two ﬁrms are competing
for a market of ﬁxed size.
Since, at the contest stage, there are no changes in the situation from the
point of view of the workers, equilibrium eﬀort levels for a given wage w are
still described by Proposition 1.
As can be seen from the proﬁt function (10), the introduction of com-
petition renders external recruiting less attractive. The reason is that the
recruiting contest gives incentives to all participating workers, which includes
the workforce of the competing ﬁrm in case of external recruiting. Since in
our stylized model all incentives are tied to F’s recruiting decision, work-
16ers who are not admitted to the contest thus have no incentive to spend
any eﬀort. If ﬁrm F shuts down its contest for external candidates we have
 
j∈N ˆ F ej = 0. Therefore, the introduction of product market competition
can only yield new results in the case where the ﬁrm would open its career
system to external workers in the absence of competition. This case is de-
scribed by conditions (6) and (7) of Proposition 2. In the remainder of this
section we restrict our attention to this situation. Let Ψ denote the inverse
of function ψ′. Then we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Consider the case that conditions (6) and (7) hold, so that
ﬁrm F would admit external applicants in the absence of product market
competition. Furthermore, let ﬁrm F strictly prefer a positive wage. Firm F
still allows external workers to apply despite product market competition iﬀ
nFH > n ˆ FH and
(nF − 1)n2
H








In that case, F optimally chooses
w
∗ = Φ3   Ψ(Φ3) with Φ3 =
n2
H
(nFH − n ˆ FH)(nH − 1)tH
. (12)
Otherwise, F does not admit external applications and chooses a wage w∗
corresponding to the second case of (9) with V being replaced by Ψ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 shows that with product market competition two additional
conditions – nFH > n ˆ FH and inequality (11) – need to hold for F to open up
its career system. Firm F now has to consider the negative externalities in
form of the career incentives for the workers in ﬁrm ˆ F. These externalities
only arise for H-type workers since the L-type workers in both ﬁrms will
be completely discouraged and drop out of the job-competition. Firm F
17thus has to consider the number of H-type workers n ˆ FH at the competing
ﬁrm, which yields the two additional conditions. If nFH < n ˆ FH ﬁrm ˆ F will
gain more from career incentives than ﬁrm F since ˆ F employs more H-type
workers. In that case, ﬁrm F would unambiguously harm itself by opening
its career system for external hires. Thus, nFH > n ˆ FH describes a necessary
condition for ﬁrm F to admit external candidates.
Note that, from the viewpoint of job assignment, opening its career system
should especially beneﬁt a ﬁrm if it has only few high-ability workers. In that
case, admitting external candidates can be very useful for a ﬁrm to increase
the average quality of its workforce. This motive for external recruiting
is well-known in the literature (e.g., Chan 1996). However, Proposition 3
shows that from an incentive perspective a relatively small number of high-
ability workers may counteract the admission of external hires due to the
career system’s negative externalities when both ﬁrms are located in the same
market. The other way round, ﬁrm F will rather tend to accept external
applications if its rival ˆ F employs many L-type workers (who completely
drop out) and only few H-type workers (who are motivated by the career
system).
Moreover, opening the career system requires condition (11) to hold.
Again, the number of H-type workers of the other ﬁrm ˆ F turns out to be
crucial. There are several eﬀects of a large value of n ˆ FH. First, n ˆ FH has to
be suﬃciently large to make ﬁrm F’s L-type workers drop out by choosing
zero eﬀorts. Second, the larger n ˆ FH the larger will be the number of ﬁrm
ˆ F’s H-type workers that beneﬁt from the career incentives. Third, the larger
n ˆ FH the more the H-type workers in both ﬁrms will be discouraged since the




(nFH + n ˆ FH) − 1
(nFH + n ˆ FH)
2 tHw,
18decreases in n ˆ FH. Note that the ﬁrst eﬀect is covered by (6), which guarantees
that n ˆ FH is suﬃciently large so that L-type workers will drop out if all workers
compete against each other in a single contest. The second eﬀect is covered by
the necessary condition nFH > n ˆ FH. Hence, the third eﬀect – discouragement
of H-type workers in both ﬁrms – remains. This eﬀect should harm ﬁrm F
more than ﬁrm ˆ F because of nFH > n ˆ FH. Thus, the larger n ˆ FH the less
condition (11) should be satisﬁed. The comparison of conditions (7) and
(11) shows that this conjecture is correct. The only diﬀerence between (7)
and (11) is the replacement of nFH by nFH −n ˆ FH in the denominator of the
ﬁrst expression at the left-hand side. Hence, condition (11) is stricter than
condition (7) so that under product market competition ﬁrm F will open its
recruiting system less often to external applicants than without competition.
Since the left-hand side of (11) is monotonically increasing in n ˆ FH, (11) is
less likely to be satisﬁed for large values of n ˆ FH.
5 Simultaneous Vacancies
The ﬁndings of the previous sections have shown that a ﬁrm can proﬁt from
opening its career system to external hires in order to improve incentives of
its workforce. This section uses such a situation as the starting point: We
assume that the ﬁrm lacks appropriate candidates for the vacant position,
so that without external hiring there is no worker competition and internal
incentives are zero. Hence, a ﬁrm must open its career system to external
applicants if it wants to generate strictly positive incentives. Up to now only
one ﬁrm had to ﬁll a vacancy. Now we consider the case where both ﬁrms
have a vacant position that needs to be staﬀed. In order to keep the analysis
tractable, we restrict our attention to two ﬁrms each employing only one
worker at the lower hierarchy level.
As before, the four numbers nAL, nAH, nBL and nBH are common knowl-
19edge of all players. However, this time, since we have nA = nB = 1, this
assumption implies that ﬁrms know the type of each individual worker. Let
tF ∈ {tL,tH} be the talent of the worker that is employed by ﬁrm F at the
lower hierarchy level (F = A,B) while the other worker, being employed by
ﬁrm ˆ F, has talent t ˆ F ∈ {tL,tH} ( ˆ F  = F). The timeline is similar to that of
the basic model, with the exception that now there are two ﬁrms that move
simultaneously in stages 1 and 2: First, both ﬁrms have to decide on whether
to accept an application from the external candidate or not. At the second
stage, ﬁrms A and B attach wages wA and wB to their vacant positions. At
the third stage, workers simultaneously choose eﬀorts. Finally, workers are
assigned to jobs and payments are made. We assume that each ﬁrm must ﬁll
its vacancy with one of the workers.
If a ﬁrm does not open its career system to the external worker, only the
internal worker will compete for the vacant job. Career incentives will not
work in such one-person contest since the internal candidate will be promoted
with certainty. Consequently, he will exert zero eﬀort. Firm F anticipates
this behavior and chooses wF = 0. As, by assumption, each ﬁrm must ﬁll its
vacancy with one of the workers, it is always optimal for the ﬁrms to accept
external applications. However, they are free to choose between wF = 0 and
wF > 0.
Given both ﬁrms’ wages wF ≥ 0 and w ˆ F ≥ 0, the two workers will com-
pete for the higher wage max{wF,w ˆ F}. Let eF denote the eﬀort level chosen
by the worker in ﬁrm F (F = A,B) and e ˆ F the eﬀort of the worker being
employed by ﬁrm ˆ F. The worker of ﬁrm F gets max{wF,w ˆ F} with proba-
bility eF/(eF + e ˆ F) and min{wF,w ˆ F} with probability 1 − eF/(eF + e ˆ F) =
e ˆ F/(eF + e ˆ F). He maximizes his expected utility
max{wF,w ˆ F}
eF
eF + e ˆ F









20= min{wF,w ˆ F} +
eF
eF + e ˆ F
|wF − w ˆ F| −
eF
tF
(F, ˆ F = A,B; F  = ˆ F).
Straightforward calculations show that his optimal eﬀort is given by
e
∗
F = |wF − w ˆ F|   TF with TF :=
t2
Ft ˆ F
(tF + t ˆ F)2. (13)
Obviously, if both ﬁrms attach zero wages to their vacant positions or oﬀer
identical wages, both workers’ optimal eﬀorts will be zero.
5.1 Firms in Separate Product Markets
In this subsection, we assume that both ﬁrms operate in diﬀerent product
markets. Hence, we are back in the situation of Section 3, which is now





F) − wF = max
wF≥0
v (|wF − w ˆ F|   TF) − wF, (14)
while at the same time ﬁrm ˆ F maximizes
v (|wF − w ˆ F|   T ˆ F) − w ˆ F with T ˆ F :=
tFt2
ˆ F
(tF + t ˆ F)2. (15)
Assume for a moment that w ˆ F = 0. Then we have e∗
F = wFTF according to
(13). Hence, ﬁrm F’s best response w∗



















F ˆ F follows from F’s ﬁrst-order condition. Let analogously w∗
ˆ F (wF)
denote ˆ F’s best response to wF. Given wF = 0, the best response w∗
ˆ F (0) =
w∗
ˆ FF if T ˆ Fv′ (0) > 1 can be derived in the same way as (16). Note that
any relation w∗
LH R w∗






HtL , but V ( ) is
monotonically decreasing. We obtain the following results for the optimal




(tH+tL)2v′ (0) > 1. For simultaneous vacancies and ﬁrms
operating in diﬀerent product markets, there are two scenarios: (1) If workers
are homogeneous (i.e., tF = t ˆ F =: t ∈ {tH,tL}), there are two pure equilibria
(w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,w∗
ˆ FF) and (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (w∗
F ˆ F,0) with w∗
F ˆ F = w∗







There also exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. (2) If workers
are heterogeneous, so that tF,t ˆ F ∈ {tH,tL}, tF  = t ˆ F, with w∗




ˆ F) = (0,w∗















F ˆ F + w
∗
ˆ FF; (17)
otherwise there are two equilibria (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,w∗





Proof. See Appendix A.
The condition given at the beginning of Proposition 4 excludes corner
solutions where both ﬁrms choose zero wages. The results show that in the
pure equilibria exactly one ﬁrm chooses a positive wage. This main ﬁnding
is due to the fact that, given a zero wage wF of ﬁrm F, the other ﬁrm ˆ F
generates a positive externality by choosing a positive wage, which induces
incentives to both workers. Firm F now must decide whether to free-ride and
keep the zero wage wF = 0, or to deviate to a strictly positive wage wF > 0.
However, in the latter case any rational positive wage must be at least twice
as high as w ˆ F because otherwise F destroys existing incentives (see (13)) at
positive costs. The proof of Proposition 4 shows that such a deviation by F
does not pay out for the ﬁrms in case of homogeneous workers or moderate
degrees of heterogeneity.
If both workers are homogeneous or not too heterogeneous (i.e., tH −tL is
suﬃciently small), then the two ﬁrms will face a coordination problem similar
to the battle of the sexes. Both ﬁrms strictly favor the outcome that one of
22them creates incentives and the other one free rides by choosing a zero wage,
but each of them prefers to be the free rider. If the ﬁrms fail to coordinate,
they will end up in a situation with minimal (in the homogeneous case: zero)
incentives. As worst possible outcome, both ﬁrms choose positive wages to
generate incentives, but the two wages just oﬀset each other in (13).
In case of strong heterogeneity, the two abilities tH and tL can diﬀer so
much that condition (17) is satisﬁed. Now workers’ incentives are strictly
more valuable to one of the two ﬁrms. This ﬁrm always prefers to generate
incentives by choosing a positive wage irrespective of whether the other ﬁrm
oﬀers a positive wage or not. This strong preference solves the coordination
problem. In the unique equilibrium, the ﬁrst ﬁrm induces high incentives,
whereas the latter ﬁrm optimally decides to free ride.
Numerical approximations show that mixed equilibria are also character-
ized by ﬁrms attempting to free-ride on the incentives set by the opponent.
Figure 1 displays the equilibrium of a discretized game for a concrete choice
of parameters.13 In equilibrium, both ﬁrms set a wage of zero with a sub-
stantial probability and mix rather evenly over an interval above zero with
the remaining mass.14
From a welfare perspective, the positive externality by inducing incentives
for the external worker leads to an additional ineﬃciency. Consider, for
example, the case of homogeneous workers (tF = t ˆ F = t). Eﬃcient or ﬁrst-
best eﬀort eFB maximizes v (e) − e








13See Appendix B for technical details.
14We strongly conjecture that a similar mixed equilibrium exists also for the heteroge-
neous case. For discretized versions of the game, existence follows from results such as
Harsanyi (1973) showing that typical games possess an odd number of Nash equilibria.










The ranking of the three eﬀort levels is quite intuitive. Since the value gen-
erated by the external worker does not accrue to ﬁrm F, optimal incentives
are smaller than in the two-person job-promotion contest organized by the
multi-plant corporation. Thus, from a welfare perspective both ﬁrms A and
B should merge to a multi-plant ﬁrm in order to internalize the positive
externalities in incentive creation.
5.2 Product Market Competition
As in Section 4, the two ﬁrms are assumed to serve the same product mar-
ket. Therefore, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is described by (10). However, as
a crucial diﬀerence to Section 4, now both ﬁrms have a vacant position at
the higher hierarchy level and simultaneously compete for the workers at the
lower hierarchy levels. We keep the assumption introduced at the beginning
of Section 5 that each ﬁrm has exactly one worker at the lower hierarchy
level. Let, w.l.o.g., ∆t := tF − t ˆ F ≥ 0 with tF and t ˆ F denoting the talents
of the two workers at the lower hierarchy level in ﬁrm F and ﬁrm ˆ F, respec-
tively. Hence, either both ﬁrms have equally talented workers in the initial
situation or ﬁrm F has an H-type worker and ﬁrm ˆ F an L-type worker.
Equilibrium eﬀort levels in the recruiting contest are again given by (13).
Inserting into (10) shows that ﬁrm F solves
max
wF≥0
ψ (|wF − w ˆ F|   T   ∆t) − wF, with T :=
tFt ˆ F
(tF + t ˆ F)2, (18)
25whereas ˆ F solves
max
w ˆ F≥0
ψ (−|wF − w ˆ F|   T   ∆t) − w ˆ F. (19)
The solution of the game between ﬁrms F and ˆ F can be characterized as
follows:
Proposition 5 If workers are homogeneous (i.e., tF = t ˆ F =: t ∈ {tH,tL}),
there exists the unique equilibrium (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,0). Under heterogeneous
workers (i.e., tF = tH and t ˆ F = tL), either a pure equilibrium (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) =
(0,0) exists or an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If ﬁrms are homogeneous, no one can achieve a competitive advantage
by inducing incentives. Consequently, each ﬁrm chooses a zero wage to save
costs. If ﬁrms are heterogeneous but marginal returns are too small, there
will be a corner solution with both ﬁrms again setting zero wages. In case
of heterogeneous ﬁrms and an interior solution, only mixed equilibria exist.
Figure 2 displays a discrete approximation of such an equilibrium in a numer-
ical example.16 We see that ﬁrms mix over the same support. Firm F puts a
substantial probability mass on the highest wage in the support, while ﬁrm
ˆ F puts considerable mass on zero. In this example, ﬁrm F earns a payoﬀ of
about 2 while ﬁrm ˆ F earns about 0.5. If both ﬁrms would escape competition
by setting a wage of zero, both would earn a bit more than 1.5. Compared
to this, due to its stronger position ﬁrm F can gain about 0.5 while the sum
of payoﬀs is reduced by 0.5 in equilibrium.
The logic behind this equilibrium is rather intricate: Firm F prefers the
two wages to be as far apart as possible, while ﬁrm ˆ F prefers them to be
16See Appendix B for technical details.
26to worker discouragement. Positive externalities are generated if external
recruiting induces a homogenization of active players which boosts the in-
centives of a ﬁrm’s high-ability workers. The ﬁrm prefers external recruiting,
if the positive externalities dominate the negative ones.
Second, there are externalities between the ﬁrms’ wage policies in case of
simultaneous vacancies since high wages attached to vacant positions oﬀset
each other. If we have one strong ﬁrm and one weak ﬁrm, the latter one uses
external recruiting and strategic wage setting to eliminate its competitive
disadvantage in the product market. This case shows that – besides employee
poaching – a ﬁrm may choose its personnel policy to strategically harm a
competing ﬁrm.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1:
If eL1,...,eLmL denote the eﬀorts of the L-type workers and eH1,...,eHmH
























If w > 0, there cannot be an equilibrium with each worker exerting zero eﬀort
because then one of the workers can switch to a marginal amount of positive
eﬀort and wins w for sure. Since each worker has a strictly concave objective
function, worker α either optimally chooses e∗
Lα = 0 if EU′
Lα (0) ≤ 0, or
28e∗
Lα > 0 with EU′
Lα (e∗
Lα) = 0 if EU′







= 0 if EU′
Hβ (0) ≤ 0






= 0 if EU′
Hβ (0) > 0.
Hence, a corner solution e∗




















































Next, we show that there is a unique equilibrium with all workers of
the same type choosing identical eﬀort levels. To show uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium we follow an approach put forward by Cornes and Hartley




j∈{1,...,mH} eHj. From (20) we know that
for e∗
Lα > 0 we must have
E−e∗
Lα





















, which is the unique possible equi-
librium value of eLα given that the sum of all eﬀort levels is equal to E.
29Similarly, deﬁne e∗









. Then, a necessary con-
dition for (eL1,...,eLmL,eH1,...,emH) being an equilibrium is that the sum of
these eﬀort levels E is equal to the sum of the equilibrium eﬀort levels from
e∗
Lα (E) and e∗

































The RHS of (21) is decreasing in E, has value m > 1 for E = 0, and tends to
0 for E → ∞. Hence, a unique value E∗ exists satisfying (21). Since e∗
Lα (E)
and e∗
Hβ (E) constitute the unique equilibrium candidate for a given value E,
the unique equilibrium is given by e∗
Lα(E∗) and e∗
Hβ(E∗). Thus there exists a
unique equilibrium and it has the property that all workers of the same type
choose identical eﬀort levels.





H (β = 1,...,mH). The condition for the corner
solution e∗
Lα = e∗








and the conditions for an interior solution e∗
Lα = e∗

















































First, we can show by contradiction that a solution e∗
L > 0 and e∗
H = 0
is not possible. For this solution (24) and (25) must hold at the same time.
Inserting e∗
H = 0 into (24) yields e∗
L = [tL (mL − 1)w]/m2
L. Plugging into
(25) and rewriting gives tHmL ≤ tL (mL − 1), a contradiction.
However, a corner solution with e∗
L = 0 and e∗
H > 0 is possible. Combining
(22) with (27) and e∗







w and tH ≥
mH
mH − 1
tL (mH > 1),
where the last inequality is clearly satisﬁed for mH → ∞.
Finally, an interior solution with e∗
L > 0 and e∗
H > 0 is described by the
two ﬁrst-order conditions (24) and (27). Straightforward computations yield
(4) and (5).
Proof of Proposition 2:
If nL = 0 or nH = 0, competing workers are homogeneous irrespective of
whether ﬁrm F allows external applicants or not. In this situation, F strictly
beneﬁts from excluding external hires since a worker’s individual equilibrium
eﬀort decreases in the number of contestants.
The other possible situations can be divided into three cases. Case (1)
deals with tL ≤ tH
nFH−1
nFH . Then L-type workers drop out with and without






















if it allows external workers to apply. Since (nFH − 1)/n2
FH ≥ (nH − 1)/n2
H,
ﬁrm F prefers to exclude external candidates. Because its objective function












given that v′ (0)
nFH−1
nFH tH > 1 guarantees an interior solution. The ﬁrst-order
condition can be rewritten to the expression given in the ﬁrst line of (9).
Case (2) is characterized by tH
nFH−1
nFH < tL ≤ tH
nH−1
nH . Now, L-type work-
ers drop out with external recruiting but do not drop out without external
hires. Using (4) and (5), under pure internal career competition ﬁrm F
maximizes
v (nFH   e
∗
H + nFL   e
∗
L) − w = v
 





If F additionally includes external candidates, his L-type workers will drop
















tL (nF − 1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
,
which can be rewritten to (7). If F prefers to allow external job candidates
it will maximize (29), leading to (8). Otherwise, F maximizes (28), yielding
the expression in the second line of (9).
Case (3) deals with tH
nH−1
nH < tL. Now, L-type workers will not drop
out irrespective of whether ﬁrm F allows external applicants or not. Thus,
the only eﬀect of opening the career system is an increase in the number
of L-type and H-type contestants without inﬂuencing the number of eﬀort
spending internal workers. We can show that such opening does not pay
for the ﬁrm since the negative incentive eﬀect of an increased number of
contestants always dominates a possibly positive incentive eﬀect by a less
heterogeneous ﬁeld of contestants (see the additional pages for the referees).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let conditions (6) and (7) be fulﬁlled. As before, L-type workers drop out
with external recruiting but do not drop out without external hires. Using
(4) and (5), under pure internal career competition ﬁrm F maximizes in
analogy to (28):
ψ (nFH   e
∗
H + nFL   e
∗
L) − w = ψ
 





If F additionally invites external job applicants, all L-type workers will drop
out and F maximizes
ψ (nFH   e
∗
H − n ˆ FH   e
∗
H) − w = ψ
 







33Thus, for any positive wage w ﬁrm F will prefer external recruiting iﬀ





tL (nF − 1)
(nFHtL + nFLtH)
.
This condition can only be satisﬁed for nFH > n ˆ FH. In that case, it can be
rewritten to (11), and F maximizes (30) leading to (12). Otherwise, we are
in the analogous situation as without product market competition where F
maximizes (28), yielding the expression in the second line of (9) with function
V being replaced by Ψ.
Proof of Proposition 4:
To prove the proposition, we can make use of the following two lemmas:
Lemma 1 If wF > 0, then w∗
ˆ F (wF) / ∈ (0,2wF], F, ˆ F ∈ {A,B}, F  = ˆ F.
Proof. Given wF > 0, ﬁrm ˆ F’s objective function (15) is strictly larger for
w ˆ F = 0 than for w ˆ F ∈ (0,2wF].
Hence, investing in incentives can only be proﬁtable to a ﬁrm if the ex-
isting incentives induced by the other ﬁrm are at least doubled. Otherwise,
such investment would deteriorate existing incentives at positive costs.
Lemma 2 If wF ≥ w∗
ˆ FF, then w∗
ˆ F (wF) = 0.
Proof. w∗
ˆ F (wF) / ∈ (0,2wF] due to Lemma 1. w ˆ F > 2wF cannot be a best
reply to wF ≥ w∗
ˆ FF either: Problem
max
w ˆ F
v ((w ˆ F − wF)T ˆ F) − w ˆ F (31)
is solved by w ˆ F = w∗
ˆ FF + wF ≤ 2wF. Since (31) is strictly concave, ˆ F
prefers w ˆ F = 2wF when choosing w ˆ F ∈ [2wF,∞). However, w ˆ F = 0 would
implement the same eﬀort level at zero costs.
34Lemma 2 states that a ﬁrm should completely save costs by choosing a
zero wage if the other ﬁrm already induces suﬃcient incentives.
Now we can prove Proposition 4. We start with the case of homogeneous
workers: tF = t ˆ F =: t, so that
w
∗
F (0) = w
∗













HH if t = tH
w∗
LL if t = tL
(32)
according to (16).
(1) If wF = 0, then w∗
ˆ F (0) = w∗
ˆ FF = w∗







Given this behavior of ˆ F, ﬁrm F has no incentive to deviate (Lemma 2).
(2) If wF ≥ w∗
F ˆ F = w∗
ˆ FF, then w∗
ˆ F (wF) = 0 by Lemma 2. Given w ˆ F = 0,
ﬁrm F will choose w∗
F (0) = w∗
F ˆ F (see (32)) and no ﬁrm has an incentive to
deviate.
(3) If wF ∈ (0,w∗
F ˆ F] = (0,w∗
ˆ FF], then w∗
ˆ F (wF) / ∈ (0,2wF] (Lemma 1).
There are three possibilities: (i) If ˆ F reacts by choosing w ˆ F ≥ w∗
ˆ FF = w∗
F ˆ F,
then w∗
F (w ˆ F) = 0 (Lemma 2) and w∗
ˆ F (0) = w∗
ˆ FF = w∗
F ˆ F according to (32).
(ii) If ˆ F reacts by choosing w ˆ F = 0, then w∗
F (0) = w∗
F ˆ F = w∗
ˆ FF (see (32)) and
no one deviates. (iii) If ˆ F reacts by choosing w ˆ F ∈ (2wF,w∗
ˆ FF] = (2wF,w∗
F ˆ F],






(w ˆ F − wF)t
4
 
− w ˆ F.
Since in case (iii), by assumption, ˆ F does not react by choosing zero eﬀort
(i.e., there is not a corner solution at zero as in case (ii))), the ﬁrst-order







ˆ FF ⇔ w ˆ F =
w∗
ˆ FF +wF. Because in case (iii) ˆ F is restricted to w ˆ F ∈ (2wF,w∗
ˆ FF] and since
the ﬁrm’s objective function is strictly concave, ˆ F will choose the corner
solution w ˆ F = w∗
ˆ FF. Then w∗
F (w ˆ F) = 0 (Lemma 2) and no one deviates.
Existence of a symmetric mixed equilibrium can be shown as follows:
35Denote again by w∗
F ˆ F the wage one ﬁrm sets given that the other ﬁrm ˆ F
sets a wage of zero. By the concavity of v, ﬁrm F will not respond with
a wage strictly greater than w∗
F ˆ F to any strategy of ﬁrm ˆ F and vice-versa.
Thus, any equilibrium of the restricted game where ﬁrms can set wages only
in the interval [0,w∗
F ˆ F] must be an equilibrium of the original game as well.
Payoﬀs in the restricted game are continuous and bounded and the action
space is compact. Thus, by the main result of Becker and Damianov (2006)
the restricted game possesses a symmetric equilibrium which is then also an
equilibrium of the unrestricted game. Since there are no symmetric pure
equilibria, this equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
Second, we examine the heterogeneous case with tF,t ˆ F ∈ {tH,tL}; tF  =
t ˆ F. As any relation w∗
LH R w∗
HL is possible and the special case w∗
LH =
w∗
HL has already been discussed in the previous paragraph on homogeneity,
without loss of generality it is suﬃcient to consider the remaining general
case w∗
F ˆ F < w∗
ˆ FF with F, ˆ F ∈ {A,B}, F  = ˆ F.
(1a) If wF = 0, then w∗
ˆ F (0) = w∗
ˆ FF. Given this behavior of ˆ F, ﬁrm F has
no incentive to deviate (Lemma 2).
(1b) If w ˆ F = 0, then w∗
F (0) = w∗
F ˆ F. Given wF = w∗
F ˆ F, note that
w∗
ˆ F(w∗
F ˆ F) / ∈ (0,2w∗
F ˆ F]. However, deviation to w ˆ F ≥ 2w∗
F ˆ F can be optimal:












− w ˆ F,
which leads to the solution w ˆ F = w∗
F ˆ F + w∗
ˆ FF ≥ 2w∗
F ˆ F. ˆ F will only devi-
ate if this gives a higher expected proﬁt compared to the initial situation
(wF,w ˆ F) = (w∗















F ˆ F + w
∗
ˆ FF.
If this condition holds, (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (w∗
F ˆ F,0) is an equilibrium. Otherwise, ˆ F
will deviate to w ˆ F = w∗
F ˆ F + w∗
ˆ FF and we will end up in (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,w∗
ˆ FF)
36due to Lemma 2.
(2a) If wF ≥ w∗
ˆ FF, then w∗
ˆ F (wF) = 0 by Lemma 2. Given w ˆ F = 0, ﬁrm F
will choose w∗
F (0) = w∗
F ˆ F and we are back in the reasoning of (1b), resulting
either in (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,w∗
ˆ FF) or in (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (w∗
F ˆ F,0).
(2b) If w ˆ F ≥ w∗
F ˆ F, then w∗
F (w ˆ F) = 0 by Lemma 2. Given wF = 0, ﬁrm
ˆ F will choose w∗
ˆ F (0) = w∗
ˆ FF and no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate.
(3a) If wF ∈ (0,w∗
ˆ FF], then w∗
ˆ F (wF) / ∈ (0,2wF] (Lemma 1). There are
three possibilities: (i) If ˆ F reacts by choosing w ˆ F ≥ w∗
F ˆ F, then w∗
F (w ˆ F) = 0
(Lemma 2) and w∗
ˆ F (0) = w∗
ˆ FF. (ii) If ˆ F reacts by choosing w ˆ F = 0, then
w∗
F (0) = w∗
F ˆ F and we are back in the reasoning of (1b), resulting either in
(w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,w∗
ˆ FF) or in (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (w∗
F ˆ F,0). (iii) If ˆ F reacts by choosing
w ˆ F ∈ (2wF,w∗




v ((w ˆ F − wF)T ˆ F) − w ˆ F.
The ﬁrst-order condition leads to w ˆ F = w∗
ˆ FF + wF. Because in case (iii)
ˆ F is restricted to w ˆ F ∈ (2wF,w∗
F ˆ F] and since the ﬁrm’s objective function
is strictly concave, ˆ F will choose the corner solution w ˆ F = w∗
F ˆ F. Then
w∗
F (w ˆ F) = 0 (Lemma 2) followed by w∗
ˆ F (0) = w∗
ˆ FF and no one further
deviates.
(3b) If w ˆ F ∈ (0,w∗
F ˆ F], we also have to consider three possibilities: (i) If F
reacts by choosing wF ≥ w∗
ˆ FF, then w∗
ˆ F (wF) = 0 followed by w∗
F (0) = w∗
F ˆ F




ˆ FF) or in (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (w∗
F ˆ F,0). (ii) If F reacts by choosing wF = 0, then
w∗
ˆ F (0) = w∗
ˆ FF and no one has an incentive to deviate. (iii) If F reacts by
choosing wF ∈ (0,w∗
ˆ FF) we are back in the reasoning of (3a) resulting into
(w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,w∗
ˆ FF) or (w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (w∗
F ˆ F,0).
37Proof of Proposition 5:
If workers are homogeneous, then ∆t = 0 in (18) and (19), so that each
ﬁrm chooses a zero wage as dominant strategy. The result on heterogeneous
workers follows from the ﬁrms’ best-response functions.
Lemma 3 The best response of ﬁrm ˆ F satisﬁes w∗
ˆ F (wF) ≤ wF.
Proof. The claim can be proved by contradiction. Suppose that w ˆ F > wF
in (19). Then ˆ F strictly gains from switching to w′
ˆ F with w′
ˆ F < w ˆ F and




(tH+tL)2ψ′ (0) < 1, then F’s best response to w ˆ F = 0 is given by
w∗
F (0) = 0 and, applying Lemma 3, both ﬁrms end up in equilibrium
(w∗
F,w∗
ˆ F) = (0,0). If
tHtL∆t
(tH + tL)2ψ
′ (0) > 1, (33)
then (0,0) is not a Nash equilibrium and, as we argue next, no pure equilib-
rium exists. Note ﬁrst that there cannot be a pure equilibrium where both
ﬁrms set the same wage w > 0: Assume (w,w) is a Nash equilibrium. Since
costs are linear, if neither ﬁrm wants to deviate to ˜ w = w+z for some z > 0,
then due to the linearity of costs both ﬁrms setting a wage of 0 must be a
Nash equilibrium as well which contradicts our assumption that (0,0) is not
an equilibrium.17
Moreover, there cannot be a pure equilibrium where ﬁrm F sets w and
ﬁrm ˆ F sets ˆ w > w by Lemma 3. Finally, we have to show that there cannot
be an equilibrium where ﬁrms play wages w and ˆ w with w > ˆ w. To simplify
notation, we deﬁne φ(x) := ψ(x   T   ∆t). Since this is merely a rescaling,
φ inherits all properties we assumed for ψ. In order to show that we do
not have a Nash equilibrium, it suﬃces to consider small deviations which
17Clearly, the opposite implication does not hold: From (w,w) ﬁrms can deviate to both,
higher and lower wages while from (0,0) they can only deviate to higher wages. Thus,
(0,0) being an equilibrium does not imply that (w,w) is an equilibrium as well.
38leave w − ˆ w positive. Therefore, we can leave away the absolute value and
assume that ﬁrm F earns a payoﬀ of φ(w − ˆ w) − w and ﬁrm ˆ F earns a
payoﬀ of φ(ˆ w − w) − ˆ w. By our assumption that φ(x) + φ(−x) is constant,
we have that φ′(x) = φ′(−x) and φ′′(x) = −φ′′(−x). Thus, if the ﬁrst-
order condition φ′(w − ˆ w) = 1 of ﬁrm F is satisﬁed, then ˆ F’s ﬁrst-order
condition φ′(ˆ w − w) = 1 is satisﬁed as well. Now, consider second-order
conditions: Since we assumed φ to be concave for positive arguments, we
have φ′′(w − ˆ w) < 0, so that ﬁrm F is indeed in a local maximum. The
second derivative of ﬁrm ˆ F’s payoﬀ is φ′′( ˆ w − w) = −φ′′(w − ˆ w) > 0. Thus,
ﬁrm ˆ F is in a local minimum and prefers to deviate to a marginally smaller
or larger wage. Therefore, no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
It remains to be shown that a Nash equilibrium exists. Whenever no pure
equilibrium exists this must be a mixed equilibrium. We ﬁrst argue that ﬁrms
do not play wages greater than w = limx→∞ ψ(x) in any equilibrium: Firm
F can guarantee itself a non-negative payoﬀ through setting a wage of 0
regardless of its opponent’s strategy. Since setting a wage greater than w
leads to a negative payoﬀ for ﬁrm F regardless of the opponent’s strategy,
ﬁrm F does not play wages outside [0,w] in any equilibrium. Now, consider
ﬁrm ˆ F. By Lemma 3, if ﬁrm F plays a pure strategy w, ﬁrm ˆ F is better
oﬀ playing w than setting a wage strictly higher than w. Likewise, if ﬁrm F
plays a mixed strategy, ﬁrm ˆ F does not play wages above the support of F’s
strategy in equilibrium. Therefore, neither ﬁrm plays wages outside [0,w] in
any equilibrium.
Thus, an equilibrium of the restricted game where ﬁrms can only set
wages from [0,w] must be an equilibrium of the unrestricted game as well.
In the restricted game, payoﬀs are bounded and continuous and the action
space is compact. Therefore, we can apply the result of Glicksberg (1952) to
show existence of equilibrium in the restricted game. This implies existence
of equilibrium in the unrestricted game.
39Appendix B
Details of Numerical Results: The numerical examples of Sections 5.1 and
5.2 are based on the speciﬁcation




which obviously fulﬁlls the requirements we made on v and ψ. In Section 5.1
we consider tF = t ˆ F = 3
2 while in Section 5.2 we choose tF = 3 and t ˆ F = 1.18
We discretized the game allowing only wages which are multiples of 1
16. The
discretized game was solved using the software package Gambit.19
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Let e∗
L (mL,mH) and e∗
H (mL,mH) denote the equilibrium eﬀorts being de-
scribed by (4) and (5). We can ﬁrst show that increased heterogeneous com-
petition via opening the career system leads to a decrease of internal workers’






= Ω1   [nFHtL − (2nFH + nFL − 2)tH]







= Ω2   [nFHtL − (2nFH + nFL − 2)tH]
with Ω2 = Θ   (nFHtL − (nFH − 1)tH) > 0.
Only the term in square brackets of each derivative can be negative. For
the derivatives to be positive we must have that nFH > 2nFH + nFL − 2 ⇔
nFH+nFL < 2, which is impossible because each ﬁrm has at least two workers
at the lower tier of the hierarchy. For e∗









= Ω2   [nFLtH − (2nFL + nFH − 2)tL].
Similar to the derivatives before, only the term in square brackets can be
negative. It is positive iﬀ
nFLtH > (2nFL + nFH − 2)tL.
20Of course, nFL and nFH are integers. However, for nFL and nFH being not too small
e∗
L (nFL,nFH) and e∗
H (nFL,nFH) are monotonically decreasing in the number of workers
of both types so that the results on marginal changes of these numbers carry over to
discrete changes.
43Since the talent of H-type workers is restricted to tH
nFH−1
nFH < tL, to be true
the inequality must at least be satisﬁed for tH =
nFH
nFH−1tL. Inserting into the
inequality yields
(2 − nFH)(nF − 1) > 0,
which only holds for nFH = 1 and nFL ≥ 1, or for nFH = 0 and nFL ≥ 2.
Altogether, the comparative-static results point out that for nFH ≥ 2 it
does not pay oﬀ for F to enlarge worker competition by allowing external ap-
plications: Internal workers become discouraged, irrespective of the mixture
of the two ﬁrms’ workers at the lower hierarchy level. However, we still have
to check out whether increasing e∗
H (nFL,nFH) by external recruiting under
nFH = 1 or nFH = 0 outweighs lower values of e∗
L (nFL,nFH).









Allowing external applicants would lead to objective function
v
 













Note that this inequality does not hold for nH = 1. Hence, we must have
nH ≥ 2. Diﬀerentiating RHS(34) with respect to nH yields
(2 − nH)tL + nL (tH − 2tL)
(nHtL + nLtH)
3 (tL + tHnFL + (tH − tL)(nL − nHnFL))
− (tH − tL)nFL
(nH + nL − 1)
(nHtL + nLtH)
2,
44which is negative because nH ≥ 2 and tH < 2tL (since tH <
nH
nH−1tL,∀nH ≥
2). Therefore, if (34) can be satisﬁed, it must at least hold for the lower limit
nH = 2. Inserting into (34) and substituting for nL = nFL + n ˆ FL (again, ˆ F




(nFL + n ˆ FL + 1)(tL + tHnFL + (tH − tL)(n ˆ FL − nFL))
(2tL + (nFL + n ˆ FL)tH)
2 .
(35)
Diﬀerentiating RHS(35) with respect to n ˆ FL leads to
(tH − 2tL)[(nFL + 1)tHnFL + n ˆ FL (2tL + tH (nFL − 1))]
(2tL + (nFL + n ˆ FL)tH)
3 ,
which is negative due to tH < 2tL. Thus, if (35) holds, it must at least be

















which cannot be true. To sum up, F will prefer to exclude external workers
from competing with internal ones if nFH = 1.
Finally, we have to consider the case of nFH = 0. If ﬁrm F excludes
applicants from the other ﬁrm, it will maximize
v
 

























nHtL (nH + nL − 1)(nH (2tH − tL) + (nL − 2)tH)
(nHtL + nLtH)
3
is negative,21 for inequality (36) to be true it must at least hold for tH = tL.




nFL (nH + nL − 1)
(nH + nL)
2 .














nFL (nFL + n ˆ FL)






nFL + n ˆ FL




n ˆ FL + nFL − 1
(n ˆ FL + nFL + 1)
3 < 0.









which contradicts nFL ≥ 2. Thus, F will not prefer to open its career system
for external hires if nFH = 0.
21Note that we must have nL ≥ 2 since each ﬁrm consists of at least two workers at the
lower hierarchy level and since nFH = 0, which implies nFL ≥ 2 and, hence, nL ≥ 2.
22Recall from the beginning of the proof that we can exclude nH = 0.
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